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Rational Interpretation of Numerical
Quantity in Argumentative Contexts
Chris Cummins1* and Michael Franke2
1Linguistics and English Language, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 2Institute for Cognitive Science,
University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany
Numerical descriptions furnish us with an apparently precise and objective way of
summarising complex datasets. In practice, the issue is less clear-cut, partly because
the use of numerical expressions in natural language invites inferences that go beyond their
mathematical meaning, and consequently quantitative descriptions can be true but
misleading. This raises important practical questions for the hearer: how should they
interpret a quantitative description that is being used to further a particular argumentative
agenda, and to what extent should they treat it as a good argument for a particular
conclusion? In this paper, we discuss this issue with reference to notions of argumentative
strength, and consider the strategy that a rational hearer should adopt in interpreting
quantitative information that is being used argumentatively by the speaker. We exemplify
this with reference to United Kingdom universities’ reporting of their REF 2014 evaluations.
We argue that this reporting is typical of argumentative discourse involving quantitative
information in two important respects. Firstly, a hearer must take into account the
speaker’s agenda in order not to be misled by the information provided; but secondly,
the speaker’s choice of utterance is typically suboptimal in its argumentative strength, and
this creates a considerable challenge for accurate interpretation.
Keywords: pragmatic inference, argumentative language use, non-cooperative dialogue, argument strength,
information selection, quantity expressions
INTRODUCTION
How should a rational hearer interpret a statement of numerical quantity, such as 1)?
1) More than 30 states voted Democrat in the 1996 United States Presidential election.
Assuming that the speaker is accurate, the hearer can begin by deriving the semantic meaning of
the quantity expression, and arrive at the interpretation that the cardinality of the set of Democrat-
voting states in the 1996 election is greater than 30. If the hearer is willing to make additional
assumptions about the speaker’s cooperativity and knowledgeability, they can derive additional
pragmatic inferences. Specifically, they can potentially infer that the speaker is unable to assert
informationally stronger alternatives to 1), and hence either that these alternatives are false or that
the speaker is ignorant as to their truth-value. In this case, informationally stronger alternatives
potentially include those which give larger or more precise numbers (more than 40, 35) or which
describe wider date ranges (in every Presidential election).
But what if the speaker is strategic, in the sense that they wish to present information that will
optimally support a particular argumentative agenda? For the rational hearer, this creates both a
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may be unavailable, on the basis that the speaker may simply be
declining to utter stronger alternatives that are known to be true,
for purely strategic reasons. Thus, in 1), perhaps the speaker
wishes to discuss the results of the 1996 election in isolation, in
order to make a point about the relative strength of the candidates
that particular year. On the other hand, if the speaker is known to
be pursuing a particular argumentative agenda, this opens up the
possibility of the hearer drawing inferences about the falsity of
alternatives that would have been argumentatively stronger,
whether or not these are informationally stronger in the usual
pragmatic sense. For instance, a speaker who wished to argue that
the Democrats can win a comfortable majority of states might
choose to discuss the most recent example of them doing so, in
which case in 1) they would have said 2008 rather than 1996 if the
resulting sentence had still been true.
In this paper, we outline issues of rational use of language in
argumentative discourse. Rational communication in non-
cooperative contexts has been studied before, e.g., from the
perspective of game theory (Franke et al.,2012; de Jaegher and
van Rooij, 2014) and also via experimental methods (Franke
et al.,2020). The argumentative dimension has been stressed as
an important perspective on language use (Anscombre and
Ducrot, 1983) that offers an alternative to purely information-
based accounts of interaction. It has been used to explain a
variety of natural language phenomena, such as the meaning
and distribution of particles like also and even (Merin, 1999) or
that of adversarial connectives such as but (Winterstein, 2012).
Here, we focus specifically on argumentative language use in
the domain of numerical quantity expressions. We first survey
some of the relevant issues in current research on the
semantics and pragmatics of numerical quantity, under
standard assumptions about cooperativity in Standard
Semantic and Pragmatic Meanings of Numerical
Expressions. We then discuss, in Argumentative Framing
for a Single Numerical Quantity, how argumentative
motives affect a speaker’s choice of utterance when
describing a single numerical quantity. Argumentative
Framing for Complex Information States With Complex
Utterances extends these considerations to more complex
cases where more than one numerical feature is potentially
relevant for argumentative framing. Quantifying
Argumentative Strength, and Allowing for Uncooperativity
then introduces a notion of argumentative strength, following
Merin (1999), which aims to subsume the considerations laid
out in the foregoing discussion. A Case Study: Reporting the
Research Excellence Framework subsequently derives some
more concrete predictions of this approach and tests them with
reference to a small corpus of argumentative usages of quantity
expressions, drawn from the public statements made by
United Kingdom universities concerning their rankings in
the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF). We show
that these usages can usefully be understood by appeal to the
notion of argumentativity that we propose, but also that they
present a particular interpretive challenge to the hearer as a
consequence of their argumentative strength typically being
suboptimal.
STANDARD SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC
MEANINGS OF NUMERICAL
EXPRESSIONS
It is tempting to assume that expressions of numerical quantity
will be easy to formalise semantically. However, as the enduring
debates in the semantics and pragmatics literature testify, many
turn out on closer inspection to require sophisticated and subtle
analyses. The question of how to formalise these meanings is
important for semantic and pragmatic theory, but also for real-
life communication, given the crucial role that number plays in
conveying precise information that feeds into high-stakes
decision-making.
As used in natural language, ‘bare’ (unmodified) numerals
already admit multiple possible interpretations. Horn (1972)
noted that bare numerals can express both exact readings, as
in 2), and lower-bound (“at least”) readings, as seems to be
preferred for 3). In some cases, as pointed out by Carston (1998),
bare numerals appear to contribute to upper-bound (“at most”)
readings, as in 4). And round numbers in particular can also
convey approximate meanings, as discussed by Krifka (2009), as
in 5), which is widely judged true, or at least true enough, if the
number of people in the room is, for instance, 99 or 101
(Lasersohn, 1999).
2) I have three children.
3) People with three children are entitled to extra benefits.
4) You can have 2000 calories without putting on weight.
5) There are a hundred people in the room.
This ambiguity creates a potential challenge for the hearer: are
they able to recover the speaker’s intended meaning, given that
this is not linguistically signalled? This is a widespread issue.
Taking the case of approximate readings as in 5), speakers
frequently round values before reporting them, and do not
typically state that they have done so (for instance in telling
the time, e.g. 7:30pm, cf. Van der Henst et al., 2002; and indeed in
providing summary statistics for an experiment, e.g. “mean RT 
345 ms”). Hence, the way bare numerals are routinely interpreted
in natural language gives rise to some pitfalls when we attempt to
convey information with them at any given level of precision.
When speakers use modified numerals such as more than/at
most/up to 100, a different set of issues arises. The ambiguity
discussed above does not occur, as pointed out by Solt (2014): in
this case, the semantic meaning contributed by the numeral is
clearly exact. This imposes an additional constraint on the
speaker. For instance, if there are 98 people in the room, a
speaker can utter 5) and be judged to have told the truth, but
if one further person then entered the room, a speaker who
uttered 6) would still be judged to have spoken falsely, because
100 is interpreted as obligatorily exact in 6). That is to say, more
than 100 means more than precisely 100 rather than merely more
than are present in a situation of which ‘100’ could be truthfully
asserted.
6) There are more than 100 people in the room.
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However, a different kind of ambiguity, at a pragmatic level,
arises from utterances such as 6). In addition to conveying a
(semantic) lower bound on the possible value under discussion,
an expression such as more than 100 appears to convey a
(pragmatic) upper bound (Cummins et al., 2012). For
instance, the utterance of 6) typically appears to convey the
falsity of 7).
7) There are more than 200 people in the room.
Cummins et al. (2012) propose that these enriched meanings
can be treated as quantity implicatures, and more specifically
scalar implicatures: the use ofmore than 100 implicates the falsity
of the corresponding sentence with the stronger scalar alternative
more than 200. But this analysis predicts further scope for
misunderstanding between speaker and hearer, as it is not
clear which stronger alternatives should be considered to have
been negated. Shouldmore than 100 be taken to convey the falsity
ofmore than 110,more than 125,more than 150, or none of these?
A partial solution to this problem, in the spirit of traditional
approaches to scalar implicature, is to argue that the relevant
stronger alternatives–which give rise to implicatures–involve
numerals which are at least as salient as the original numeral.
The notion of granularity, as discussed by Krifka (2009), offers
one way of fleshing out this idea. The idea is that round numbers
are scale points of scales with differing granularities–60 is at once
a scale point in scales graduated by units, tens, perhaps twenties,
and so on–and only numbers which are scale points on equally
coarse-grained scales constitute scalar alternatives.
However, the limits of this approach are clear. As applied to
round numbers in neutral contexts, the hearer still needs to
understand which scale a speaker means to evoke–when they
say more than 100, are they thinking of 100 as a scale point on a
scale of tens, or 25s, or 100s? This will determine whether the
scalar alternative is more than 110, more than 125, or more than
200. Various considerations might influence how hearers attempt
to resolve this problem (see Hesse and Benz, 2020). And specific
contexts may be associated with particular scales which
supervene. For instance, salient milestones in the
United Kingdom Singles Chart traditionally include Top 75
and Top 40, but not Top 50: a song that peaked at #48 could
reasonably just be called a Top 75 hit, contrary to the predictions
of a general granularity-driven account.
Both at a semantic and pragmatic level, then, the
interpretation of numerical expressions creates challenges for
the hearer, as the speaker is not obliged to signal the precise sense
in which they intend a numeral to be interpreted. And so far we
have assumed throughout that we are dealing with a cooperative
discourse environment, in which the speaker intends their
message to be perfectly reconstructed by the hearer.
What about discourses that are not fully cooperative in the
sense of aiming for accurate, precise information transmission?
Suppose, in particular, that the speaker wishes the hearer to get a
false impression about a particular quantity. We have already
seen how this situation might arise by accident–the hearer might
take a precise numeral to be an approximation, a lower-bound
numeral to be precise, or a modified numeral to give rise to an
implicature that was not intended. Can an argumentative speaker
exploit these natural possibilities for misunderstanding in order
to mislead the hearer in a particular direction? And if so, how
should a rational hearer respond in order not to be misled?
The following sections look in more detail at the interplay
between, on the one hand, the pragmatic interpretation of
quantity words as studied in the context of standard
information-seeking cooperative discourse, and, on the other
hand, a speaker’s interest in presenting a known state of
affairs in a particularly favourable light. Argumentative
Framing for a Single Numerical Quantity looks at the
arguably more basic case in which the relevant information is
just a single numerical quality, and the speaker knows this
precisely, but wishes the hearer to perceive it to be as high as
possible. Argumentative Framing for Complex Information
States With Complex Utterances extends this analysis to more
complex situations where more than one feature matters for the
speaker’s argumentative framing.
ARGUMENTATIVE FRAMING FOR A
SINGLE NUMERICAL QUANTITY
The goal of this section is to investigate how the pragmatic
inferences discussed in the previous section, stemming from
the usually assumed ideal of a cooperative information-
conveying discourse, may be exploited by a speaker who
knows the true value N of some numerical property but
wishes to induce in the hearer an impression that this quantity
is in fact higher than N. We refer to this situation as high-framing
of a single quantity. We first look at possibilities of high-framing
of a single quantity by using pragmatic slack, or pragmatic halos,
associated with unmodified numerals in Exploiting Pragmatic
Slack in Round Bare Numerals for High-Framing. Exploiting the
Imprecision of Round Modified Numerals for High-Framing
then looks at roundness effects associated with modified
numerals. Finally, The Potential Sub-Optimality of Non-
Round Numbers. explores the potential sub-optimality of
using precise non-round number terms for high-framing.
Exploiting Pragmatic Slack in Round Bare
Numerals for High-Framing
Suppose that a speaker, fully knowledgeable about a precise
numerical quantity N, wishes to give a hearer a maximal
impression of this quantity without speaking falsely1. What
strategies might they adopt, given what we know about the
interpretation of numerical quantity expressions?
One option is to make good use of imprecision and pragmatic
slack. If N is just below a round number, the speaker might try
1We assume throughout that we are dealing with speakers who are disposed to be
honest, in the minimal sense of not making assertions that could be judged
semantically false. However, this leaves open the possibility that such speakers may
choose to mislead their hearers pragmatically, appealing to plausible deniability
(Pinker et al., 2008).
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using that round numberM: for instance, uttering 5) when there
are in fact 98 people in the room. The hearer might interpret this
as exact, or better yet from the speaker’s point of view, as a lower-
bound, i.e. as a commitment on the speaker’s part to the existence
of a set of 100 people who are in the room.
However, if the true attendance were 102, uttering 5) would
risk the hearer getting a needlessly low impression of it, contrary
to the speaker’s interests; and if the attendance were not within
the ‘pragmatic halo’ (Lasersohn, 1999) of 100, the speaker could
not truthfully utter 5) at all.
In sum, we expect high-framing speakers who know true N to
be able to use pragmatic slack to their advantage in the following
way: use round number M > N to describe N if N is plausibly
contained in a pragmatic halo around M.
Exploiting the Imprecision of Round
Modified Numerals for High-Framing
A related but perhaps more powerful means of high-framing
is to use round modified numerals which ensure a lower-
bound interpretation in the semantics. For example, if N is
the true known number, the high-framing speaker can use
more than M, relating the quantity under discussion to some
reference pointM. Semantically, it would be natural to choose
M to be as large as possible, thus ruling out as many (low)
potential values as possible. However, pragmatically, as
discussed above, the optimal choice of M is not
straightforward, because more than M can implicate not
more than O for various values O > M. Indeed, according
to Cummins et al. (2012), the values that hearers associate
with the description more than 110 may be generally lower
than those they associate with more than 100 (although Hesse
and Benz, 2020, have apparently conflicting data on this
point). If this is so, a speaker wishing to emphasise the
largeness of a crowd of 111 might be better off uttering 6),
repeated below, rather than the semantically stronger 8).
8) There are more than 110 people in the room.
On a granularity-based account, this counterintuitive result
arises because 8) effectively leaks information about the level of
precision at which the speaker is operating–it seems highly likely
that the speaker of 8) would have uttered 9) if they could do so. By
contrast, it is not clear that the speaker of 6) is operating at such a
fine-grained level, and they might not utter 9) even if they knew it
to be true. Hence, the hearer may be more confident that 8)
implicates the falsity of 9) than they could be that 6) implicates
the falsity of 9).
9) There are more than 120 people in the room.
We conclude that speakers may choose to describe true known
N for the purpose of high-framing by using a modified numeral
like more than M, which semantically only contains a lower-
bound. If they do so, they should select M in such a way that the
expected pragmatic interpretation ofmore thanM conveys higher
values in information-seeking cooperative discourse than any
other reference point or round number M’ < N would in the
phrase more than M’.
The Potential Sub-Optimality of Non-Round
Numbers
So far, we have focused on round numbers and their potential
usefulness for high-framing. Let us now consider whether high-
framing might benefit from the use of non-round numbers.
We note first that, even with non-round numbers, the speaker
can convey additional quantity information, such as in 10) where
the non-round 19 is selected as the endpoint of a particular range.
10) If restored to operation, it would be one of the 19 largest




Describing the telescope as one of the 19 largest rather than one
of the 20 largest clearly makes a semantically stronger claim,
which supports the speaker’s apparent point that it would be an
exceptionally large telescope. However, using 19 rather than 20
invites the hearer to draw inferences about the motivation for this
precise choice–an available inference in this case being that the
telescope would rank precisely 19th in size (unless there is some
reason why we should care about precisely the 19 largest
telescopes in particular). If the hearer infers this, the speaker
has perhaps been less argumentatively effective than if the hearer
had merely concluded that the telescope would be somewhere
among the largest 20.
Similarly, in 11), the use of top 19 strongly invites the inference
that the salient stronger (given the entailment direction of the
utterance) alternative top 20 doesn’t hold–i.e. that the team
currently 20th in the CFP rankings, like Clemson, has not
faced a team currently in the committee’s top 25, which in
turn suggests that Clemson’s status is less special than the
speaker seems to want to suggest.
11) Clemson is the only team among the top 19 in the CFP
rankings that hasn’t faced a team currently in the
committee’s top 25 (https://www.espn.co.uk/college-
football/story/_/id/28196686/dabo-swinney-says-clemson-
held-different-standard-cfp-voters, retrieved 24/03/20)
A similarly complex example occurs in 12).
12) Disappointingly, 10 of the world’s 19 most unequal




Here, by similar reasoning, the hearer can infer that 19 could
not be replaced by 18, as otherwise the speaker would have done
so. It follows that the 19th most unequal country in the world is in
sub-Saharan Africa, and thus only nine of the world’s 18 most
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unequal countries are in that region. This is presumably
considered to be a less compelling argument for the speaker’s
overall thesis than 10 of the world’s 19, as otherwise they would
have uttered it in the first place.
In each of these cases, then, choosing the semantically
strongest description invites pragmatic inferences which
appear to push back against the speaker’s argumentative
goals (namely, in 11), that Clemson is distinguished by its lack
of strong opposition so far, and in 12) that inequality is
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa). Of course, the extent to
which hearers draw these inferences is an empirical question,
so it is not self-evident that these utterances constitute less
effective arguments than informationally weaker alternatives
would (for instance, one of only two teams in the top 20, or 10
of the world’s 20, respectively). However, it is equally unclear that
they constitute better arguments than informationally weaker
alternatives would.
In summary, then, the use of non-salient numbers in
utterances such as 10)–12) invites inferences about the falsity
of corresponding stronger statements involving more salient
numbers. For this reason, we might expect non-salient
numbers to be generally poor choices for high-framing.
ARGUMENTATIVE FRAMING FOR
COMPLEX INFORMATION STATES WITH
COMPLEX UTTERANCES
Examples 11) and 12) begin to show some of the complexity that
is typical of argumentative language use. In these, unlike the
previous examples, the speaker is not merely expressing one
quantity as to make it sound large or small: rather, they have
chosen two numbers with which to make a particular argument.
In 12), the speaker has not only chosen the frame X of the world’s
Y but has made a deliberate choice about how to populate it, out
of all the possible number pairs (X, Y) that would make the
sentence true, and has presumably chosen numbers which they
feel are rhetorically effective.
The broader point that this illustrates is that a speaker citing
complex data in support of their argument can do so in many
ways. An effective choice may invite the hearer to draw additional
inferences that support the speaker’s argument2. On the flip side,
an ineffective choice may invite the hearer to draw inferences that
undermine the speaker’s argument. Bill Bryson (1998): 112f
describes drawing just such inferences in response to a car
advertisement:
“[The advert] says something like ‘The new Dodge Backfire.
Rated number one against the Chrysler Inert for handling. Rated
number one against the Plymouth Repellent for mileage. Rated
number one against the Ford Eczema for repair costs.’ As you will
notice . . . in each category the Dodge is rated against only one
other competitor. . . .[I]f the Dodge were rated top against ten or
twelve or fifteen competitors in any of those categories, then
presumably the ad would have said so. Because it doesn’t say so,
one must naturally conclude that the Dodge performed worse
than all its competitors except the one cited.”
In this scenario, the sceptical hearer’s inferences derive
ultimately from the perception that a knowledgeable speaker,
with a particular argumentative agenda, has chosen to present a
very limited amount of information. The hearer infers that this
reflects a strategic decision, motivated by the fact that presenting
additional information (how the Dodge compares to the Chrysler
in mileage, etc.) would undermine the speaker’s broader
communicative goal (presenting the Dodge as the most
attractive choice).
From the standpoint of pragmatic analysis, we could formalise
this idea by noting that the advert, as described, would give rise to
a series of ad hoc implicatures to the effect that the Dodge is
inferior to the Chrysler and Plymouth (and perhaps other
competitors) in repair costs, inferior to the Chrysler and the
Ford (and perhaps other competitors) in mileage, and inferior to
the Plymouth and the Ford (and perhaps other competitors) in
handling. These ad hoc implicatures are proposed to arise on the
basis that entailment relations exist between sentence pairs such
as 13) and 14), with 14) entailing 13); and given a context in
which the stronger sentence 14) would be relevant, the utterance
of the weaker sentence 13) is taken to implicate the stronger
sentence’s falsity each time.
13) The Dodge is rated higher than the Chrysler for handling.
14) The Dodge is rated higher than the Chrysler and the
Plymouth for handling.
Given a sufficiently complex set of quantitative data, the set of
true statements that could be made about the data will be very
large. Under these circumstances, the speaker’s decision to say
whatever they decide to say, rather than any of the alternatives,
could give rise to a rich array of inferences. As an example,
consider a scenario in which 15) and 16) would each be plausible
descriptions of a situation.
15) All of the students got some of the questions right.
16) Some of the students got all of the questions right.
In purely semantic terms, neither of these sentences is strictly
more informative than the other, in the sense that no entailment
relation obtains between them. However, a hearer might feel that
one of them is more valuable than the other, as a conversational
contribution, in a world where both are true. Suppose that such a
hearer thinks that 16) is clearly the more valuable option. They
should then take the utterance of 15) by a knowledgeable speaker
to convey the negation of 16). An argumentative speaker who is
aware of the hearer’s preference can then potentially exploit it:
they can cause the hearer to believe that 16) is false (perhaps
incorrectly) by asserting 15).
In its effect, this would be much like a speaker asserting some
in order to convey not all when they know that all is the case. But
a speaker who asserts some when they know that all is the case
could be argued to be dishonest, because there is a widespread
2As discussed earlier, whether or not those inferences are true may not be
important to the argumentative speaker, although the speaker may wish them
to be covered by plausible deniability.
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understanding that some typically conveys not all in declarative
contexts–a point discussed inmore detail byMeibauer (2014) and
Franke et al. (2020). By contrast, a speaker who asserts 15) in
order to (misleadingly) convey the falsity of 16) might have some
measure of plausible deniability against the claim of dishonesty,
because speakers and hearers do not share contextually stable
intuitions about the relative usefulness of these two possible
utterances.
In summary, the above examples suggest that the
effectiveness of a particular utterance, construed as an
argument towards a particular goal, depends both on the
semantic content of the utterance and the pragmatic
inferences drawn by the hearer as a result of the utterance.
Moreover, the eventual interpretation of a hearer who takes
into account that the speaker has an argumentative agenda
may diverge considerably from the pragmatic interpretation
that they would be predicted to arrive at in cooperative
contexts. Consequently, the usual tools with which we
analyse the semantics and pragmatics of cooperative
discourse are of limited use in helping us to systematise
these ideas. In the following section, we explore how we can
address this challenge by appeal to the notion of argumentative
strength.
QUANTIFYING ARGUMENTATIVE
STRENGTH, AND ALLOWING FOR
UNCOOPERATIVITY
In the context of cooperative communication, we can use ideas
around informativity and relevance to quantify the extent to
which a candidate utterance would be a useful contribution to
the discourse, in the sense of bringing about positive cognitive
effects in the hearer, in Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) terms.
Somewhat analogously, given a (not necessarily cooperative)
situation in which a speaker wishes to make a particular point,
we can explore their choice of utterance by considering the
extent to which candidate utterances would represent good
arguments in support of that point. In the following we
therefore explore a quantitative measure of argumentative
strength of an utterance and consider the predictions that it
makes about usage under various different assumptions. In
Argumentative Strength for a Semantic Interpretation of an
Utterance we consider argument strength in the case where
hearers adopt a purely semantic interpretation of the speaker’s
utterance, and in Argumentative Strength for a Pragmatic
Interpretation of an Utterance we expand this to the case
where hearers are presumed to take into account the usual
pragmatic inferences that would be available in a cooperative
context. In Argumentative Strength for Complex Cases we
exemplify how complex contexts invite the speaker to be
more selective in their choice of utterance than standard
pragmatic theories usually accommodate. Finally, in Rational
Interpretation in an Argumentative Context, we consider the
perspective of a sceptical hearer confronted with a speaker who
is selective in this way, and examine how argumentative strength
can be evaluated in this kind of non-cooperative setting.
Argumentative Strength for a Semantic
Interpretation of an Utterance
Working within the tradition of argumentative approaches to
language (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), Merin (1999) proposes
to model the argumentative strength (arg_str) of an utterance u
with reference to the weight of evidence that it provides in
support of the speaker’s communicative goal hypothesis G.
This notion of weight of evidence can be unpacked (following
Good, 1950, and others) as a log-likelihood ratio as in Eq. (17) 3.
arg str(u,G)  log P(u|G)
P(u|¬G) (17)
Here, P(u|G) denotes the probability that utterance u is true if
hypothesis G is true, and P(u|¬G) denotes the probability that
utterance u is true if hypothesis G is false. The idea is that an
utterance with a positive argumentative strength with respect to
hypothesis G is, by definition, one that is more likely to be true if
G is true than it is to be true if G is false4.
For simple examples, it is easy to evaluate argumentative
strength according to this measure. For instance, 18) has
positive (indeed, infinitely large) argumentative strength in
support of the contention G that the Poincaré conjecture
holds, because P(u|¬G)  0 and P(u|G) > 0.
18) Grigori Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture
in 2006.
However, in more complex cases, it can be difficult to precisely
calculate argumentative strength, while it is still possible to
evaluate at least qualitative predictions based on intuition. To
illustrate this, we can revisit 11), repeated here (omitting
disappointingly) as 19). We might take it that the speaker’s
communicative goal in this context is something like 20).
19) 10 of the world’s 19 most unequal countries are in sub-
Saharan Africa.
20) Inequality is widespread in sub-Saharan Africa.
The argumentative strength of the utterance, as defined above, is
calculated from the probability that 19) is true given 20) and the
probability that 19) is true given the negation of 20). But the latter
probability, in particular, is not readily calculable for speaker or
hearer, because even if we define widespread crisply, not widespread
clearly covers a range of values. However, the speaker and hearer may
still have intuitions about the probabilistic relations between 19) and
20). For instance, we might say that 19) has positive argumentative
3The use of log-likelihood in Good’s formalism ensures that the weight of evidence
has desirable additive properties.
4Note that this definition of argumentative strength only makes reference to the
truth conditions associated with the quantity expression. For the purposes of this
paper, we do not explore the idea developed byMira Ariel (2004) and subsequently
that the use of particular quantity expressions is conventionally associated with
particular argumentative effects, although this work is compatible with that idea:
we could, for instance, take the nature of the quantity expression to inform the
hearer’s understanding of the identity of G.
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strength with respect to 20) if 21) is judged more probable than 22),
and negative argumentative strength if the reverse is true.
21) Inequality is widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, and 10 of
the world’s 19 most unequal countries are located there.
22) Inequality is not widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, and
10 of the world’s 19 most unequal countries are
located there.
By definition, an utterance with positive argumentative strength
should constitute positive evidence in favour of the speaker’s
communicative goal G over its negation, and hence a rational
hearer should respond to such an utterance by increasing the
strength of their belief in G. However, as discussed in
Argumentative Framing for a Single Numerical Quantity, an
utterance might also give rise to pragmatic enrichments that would
tend to oppose the argument being made by the speaker. This
possibility is not taken into account in Eq. (17), which is concerned
purely with the semantic content of the utterance.
Argumentative Strength for a Pragmatic
Interpretation of an Utterance
To see how pragmatic inferences which are ordinarily associated
with utterances of single-number descriptions (see Standard
Semantic and Pragmatic Meanings of Numerical Expressions
and Argumentative Framing for a Single Numerical Quantity)
might affect the notion of argumentative strength, let us return to
a simpler example. Suppose that we, as hearers, believe that our
conference will be a success if and only if more than 120 people
attend. Let S be the event that more than 120 people attend the
conference, and assume that it is common knowledge that people
will attend if and only if they have registered. A speaker who
(privately) has the argumentative goal of convincing us that the
conference will be a success then utters either 23) or 24).
23) More than 100 people registered.
24) More than 110 people registered.
On semantic grounds, P(S|(24)) ≥ P(S|(23)): that is to say, the
probability that S is true given that 24) is true is at least as great as
the probability that S is true given that 23) is true. This holds
because S is false in all worlds in which 23) is true and 24) is false.
Therefore 24) should be a better argument for S than 23) is.
However, as discussed earlier, 24) strongly invites the pragmatic
inference that S is false, which is arguably not true of 23). If this
pragmatic analysis is correct, taking that inference into account
may change the picture and result in 23) being a better argument
than 24) for the truth of S.
The general point here, once again, is that utterances which are
effective arguments on their semantics may not be effective when
pragmatic enrichments are included in the calculation. It would be
helpful to have a notion of argumentative strength that takes this
into account. More precisely, if we include pragmatic
considerations, what is necessary for argument strength is not
merely that the utterance u should bemore likely true given G than
given not-G, but rather that u should be more likely felicitously
assertable–in the sense of both being true and not giving rise to
false implicatures–given G than given not-G. Let A(u) stand for the
fact that u is felicitously assertable.We could then propose a notion
of pragmatic argument strength (prag_arg_str) as in Eq. (25).
prag arg str(u,G)  log P(A(u)|G)
P(A(u)|¬G) (25)
To illustrate how this works, we can flesh out the example of
23) and 24) further with some additional assumptions: these are
not intended to be realistic, but just serve to illustrate the
calculation process. Suppose there is a 90% probability of an
utterance being interpreted as conveying a pragmatic enrichment,
and that for more than 100 that enrichment is not more than 150
while for more than 110 it is not more than 120. For simplicity let
us suppose that no other pragmatic interpretations are in play.
Suppose further that the true value under discussion–the number
of people who have registered for the conference–is uniformly
distributed on the range [0, 200]. Recall that S is the event that
more than 120 people will attend, and we are assuming that it is
common knowledge that they will attend if and only if they have
registered.
According to the measure in Eq. (17), the argumentative
strength of utterance u toward the goal G is the log of the
ratio of P (u|G) and P (u|¬G). Here, G  S, and we consider
first the utterance more than 100. The probability that more than
100 is true given that more than 120 is true equals 1; the
probability that more than 100 is true given that more than
120 is false equals 1/6 here. Recall that we assume that the true
value is uniformly distributed on [0, 200]–if more than 120 is
false, it must lie in the range [0, 120], again uniformly distributed.
Hence the probability that it exceeds 100 is 20/120  1/6. So,
according to Eq. (17), the argumentative strength of more than
100 is equal to log(1/(1/6))  log 6 ≈ 0.78. Now we consider the
utterance more than 110. Again, the probability that more than
100 is true given that more than 110 is true equals 1; the
probability that more than 100 is true given that more than
110 is false equals 1/11 here. If more than 110 is false, the true
value is uniformly distributed on [0, 110] and has a 1/11 chance of
exceeding 100. So, per Eq. (17), the argumentative strength of
more than 110 is equal to log(1/(1/11))  log 11 ≈ 1.04, which
exceeds the argumentative strength of more than 100.
Now let us consider instead the measure in Eq. (25), under
which the argumentative strength of utterance u towards the goal
G is the log of the ratio of P (A(u)|G) and P (A(u)|¬G). Again, G 
S, and here we have adopted the assumptions that there is a 90%
probability of the utterance being pragmatically interpreted, and
that if it is,more than 100will be interpreted as not more than 150
and more than 110 will be interpreted as not more than 120.
Consider first more than 100. This is assertable in two disjoint
eventualities: i) it attracts a pragmatic interpretation and the true
value lies in the range (100, 150]5, or ii) it does not attract a
5Here we use (100, 150] to refer to the half-open interval comprising values that are
greater than 100 and less than or equal to 150, which are those values for which
more than 100 can be felicitously asserted if it implicates not more than 150.
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pragmatic interpretation and the true value lies in the range (100,
200]. If S is true, then the probability that the true value lies in the
range (100, 150] is 3/8 (because it is uniformly distributed on
(120, 200]), and the probability that the true value lies in the range
(100, 200] is 1. So the total probability that more than 100 is
assertable is (90% x 3/8 + 10% x 1)  35/80. If S is false, then the
probability that the true value lies in the range (100, 150] is 1/6
(because it is uniformly distributed on [0, 120]), and the
probability that the true value lies in the range (100, 200] is
also 1/6. So the total probability thatmore than 100 is assertable is
(90% x 1/6 + 10% x 1/6)  1/6. Hence, under the measure in Eq.
(25), the argumentative strength ofmore than 100 is log ((35/80)/
(1/6))  log (21/8)  0.419.
Now consider more than 110. This is assertable in two
disjoint eventualities: i) it attracts a pragmatic interpretation
and the true value lies in the range (110, 120], or ii) it does not
attract a pragmatic interpretation and the true value lies in the
range (110, 200]. If S is true, then the probability that the true
value lies in the range (110, 120] is zero, and the probability
that the true value lies in the range (110, 200] is 1. So the total
probability thatmore than 110 is assertable is (90% x 0 + 10% x
1)  1/10 (or, to put it another way, more than 110 is only
assertable if it attracts no pragmatic enrichment, and we are
assuming this to happen with 1/10 probability in this
illustration). If S is false, then the probability that the true
value lies in the range (110, 120] is 1/12, and the probability
that the true value lies in the range (110, 200] is also 1/12. So
the total probability that more than 110 is assertable is (90% x
1/12 + 10% x 1/12)  1/12. Hence, under the measure in Eq.
(25), the argumentative strength of more than 110 is log ((1/
10)/(1/12))  log (6/5)  0.079, which is lower than for more
than 100.
Hence, under these illustrative assumptions, more than 110 is
argumentatively stronger than more than 100 by the purely
semantic measure in Eq. (17), but argumentatively weaker
than more than 100 by the pragmatic measure in Eq. (25). A
rational hearer in a world where these assumptions held should
take either utterance as positive evidence for the goal S, but if they
are sensitive to pragmatic considerations they should interpret
more than 100 as appreciably stronger evidence than the (very
weak) more than 110.
Argumentative Strength for Complex Cases
In practice, we can think of complex quantitative data as inviting
the speaker who summarises it to choose among a wide range of
semantically true options, and even if we restrict the speaker to
utterances that do not invite false pragmatic inferences, there
may still be many possibilities in play. A striking example is
provided by 26), which appeared as a newspaper sub-headline in
2018 on the subject of Oxford University’s undergraduate
admissions.
26) Figures show one in four of [sic] colleges failed to admit a




From the context (provided by the main headline) it is clear that
the speaker’s communicative goal here is to make the point that
Oxford is failing in racial equality, as regards British students, through
its admissions policy. The factual claim offered in the headline in
support of this point clearly satisfies the criterion of having positive
argumentative strength, by the definition in Eq. (17). Moreover,
although 26) does invite potential pragmatic inferences that
weaken this effect (for instance, that three in four colleges
succeeded in fulfilling this admissions criterion), it seems very
likely that 26) also has positive argumentative strength by the
pragmatic definition suggested in Eq. (25).
At the same time, the utterance makes a strikingly complex
quantitative claim, and it does so in a way that gives rise to several
ambiguities, raising a number of potential questions in the mind
of the hearer. Should the statement be interpreted as referring to
the same colleges each year? Why are the years 2015–2017
focused on? Does one in four (of) colleges mean “a quarter of
the colleges of the university” or “one out of the four colleges
studied”? And is the scope ambiguity of (they) failed [to do this]
each year to be resolved as meaning “each year, they failed to do
this” or “in at least one year, they failed to do this”?6
We stress that, in discussing this and other examples, we do not
aim to take a position on whether the speaker’s argumentative goal in
each specific case is ultimately supported by the data that the speaker
summarises. Rather, we wish to consider how a rational hearer should
adjust their belief about the speaker’s argumentative goal, given the
statement that the speaker chose to make on this occasion.
In the case of 26), it appears clear from the context that the
speaker has a specific communicative goal in mind, and it would be
reasonable to expect the speaker to choose an utterance which
constitutes a good argument for that goal, when summarising the
large and complex dataset under discussion. We take this to be a
fairly standard argumentative context, distinguished only by the
complexity of the utterance in 26), a complexity which suggests that
the speaker is willing to entertain awide variety of possible utterances
with which to summarise their data. In effect, a rational hearer is
entitled to note that such circumstances naturally seem to call for
post hoc descriptions that involve some cherry-picking of the data.
However, if a hearer believes that this kind of cherry-picking is
occurring, this should make a difference to the interpretation that
they place on the data that is ultimately reported, much like it does to
our interpretation of post hoc statistical tests. We discuss the
implications of this in the following subsection.
Rational Interpretation in an Argumentative
Context
So far, we have only considered the perspective of an
argumentative speaker who assumes that the hearer either
6The text of the full article suggests that the answers to these questions are: 26) does
refer to the same colleges each year; the scope of the study being reported on was
just the years 2015–2017; one in fourmeans “a quarter of the colleges”; and failed . . . each
year in factmeans “in at least one year, they failed to do this”. According to the article, “[t]
he worst figures belonged to Corpus Christi College, which admitted a single black British
student in those three years”.
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interprets utterances semantically (Argumentative Strength for a
Semantic Interpretation of an Utterance) or pragmatically
(Argumentative Strength for a Pragmatic Interpretation of an
Utterance) in the usual non-argumentative manner. This is a
simplifying assumption but arguably legitimate if the speaker can
expect the hearer to be unaware or unsuspecting of a possibly
misleading framing intention. However, we should also consider
the perspective of a suspecting rational interpreter who is quite
aware of the speaker’s framing intentions.
So how should a rational hearer interpret an utterance made
by an argumentative speaker? If the speaker merely produced a
semantically truthful utterance that was drawn at random from
the whole set of semantically truthful possibilities, it would appear
rational for the hearer to increase their belief in G if the utterance
had positive argumentative strength according to the definition in
Eq. (17). If the speaker produced a pragmatically felicitous
truthful utterance that was drawn at random from the whole
set of pragmatically felicitous truthful possibilities, it would
appear rational for the hearer to increase their belief in G if
the utterance had positive argumentative strength according to
the definition in Eq. (25). However, it would not be reasonable to
suppose that an argumentative speaker should act in this way: we
expect them to produce a true and felicitous statement which is
selected to serve their argumentative goals. Consequently, the
behaviour of a rational hearer should also be more nuanced.
If we consider the set of pragmatically felicitous and truthful
utterances by which a complex data set can be summarised, post
hoc, these will vary considerably in their argumentative strength.
Indeed, for complex data, wemight reasonably expect these utterances
to range from having negative to positive argumentative strength, by
either of the measures proposed above. An optimally argumentative
speaker, according to such a metric, would be one who selected the
utterance with the greatest positive argumentative strength with
respect to their communicative goal G.
One way of characterising a rational hearer’s expectation in such a
case would be to assume that the speaker is optimally argumentative,
taking pragmatic inference into account, and hence selects the
maximally argumentatively positive utterance (of those that are
true and pragmatically felicitous) according to the definition in
Eq. (25)7. But the rational hearer should then not take this at
face value: they should be aware that an utterance selected at
random from the set of possible utterances would likely have had
much less positive argumentative strength than the one that was
in fact uttered.
In fact, if the speaker is argumentatively effective, the rational
hearer should be interested in how likely G is under the assumption
that u is the best thing that could be said in support of G (rather than
just ‘a thing that could be felicitously said in support of G’). From this
perspective, when the hearer determines whether to concur with the
speaker’s argumentative goal G on the basis of 26), the hearer should
not merely be asking whether the data presented in 26) are more
compatible with a world in which Oxford’s admissions policy is racist
or one in which it is not. Rather, they should ask whether 26) exceeds
in argumentative strength themost damning thing that could likely be
asserted of Oxford’s admissions policy in a world where it is not racist,
and they should increase the strength of their belief in G only if that
criterion is satisfied.8
To put it another way, if a rational hearer is aware that the
speaker is trying to argue for G in an optimal way, and if u could
likely be truthfully and felicitously asserted in a world where G
was not the case (and the data under discussion reflected that G
was not the case), the rational hearer should not take u as
evidence in favour of G. Rather, as a criterion for increasing
their belief in G, the rational hearer should adhere to a more
stringent rule of interpretation, along the lines of 27).
27) Increase your belief in G on the basis of utterance u iff
prag_arg_str (u, G) > prag_arg_str (v, G) for all v that are
likely to be true and assertable given ¬G.
The point we wish to emphasise here is that, given a large dataset
from a world in which G does not hold, it may well still be possible to
summarise that dataset in a way that has positive argumentative
strength with respect to G, according to themeasures proposed inEqs
(17 and 25)–searching through the set of pragmatically assertable
propositions that are true in the not-G world, we can find some that
are (perhaps highly) suggestive of the truth of G. Given a large dataset
from a world in which G does hold, an argumentatively effective
speaker should be able to do better than this–they should be able to
find pragmatically assertable propositions that constitute stronger
evidence for G than any of those which would be available in a
non-G world.
In practice, we cannot guarantee that this will be the case, because
data from a not-G world may by chance be suggestive of the truth of
G, just as data from a G world may by chance be suggestive of its
falsity–hence the use of likely in 27) and the above argument. If, by
chance, although G is in fact true, the data do not indicate it, then 27)
predicts that no statement can bemade about those datawhich should
induce a sceptical rational hearer to increase the degree of their belief
in G: we take this to be a reasonable corollary9
In practice, this approach appears to invite the hearer to be
more sceptical than is warranted. For complex data, it is unlikely
to be computationally tractable for the speaker to be able to find
the argumentatively optimal utterance given their communicative
7Note that here we do not assume that the argumentative speaker is calibrating
their choice of utterance to take into account the hearer’s scepticism–although it is
reasonable to think that an argumentative speaker may wish to do so. For ease of
exposition we shall not attempt to address this case in this paper.
8Here we are assuming that the hearer is knowledgeable about which propositions
are true in a world in which G is false. If the speaker takes the hearer to be less than
perfectly knowledgeable, the picture becomes more complicated. We discuss this
further in General Discussion.
9A sceptical hearer might, of course, take it that even data that is extremely
favourable for G might have arisen in a non-G world, just as, in the context of
experimental science, even data that admit a very small p-value might have
arisen under the null hypothesis. Consequently, they might hold that the
condition in 27) is never satisfied, because any u might be true and assertable
in a non-G world. However, beyond a point, scepticism of this kind will not be
rational, in terms of leading to a correct understanding of the likely world
state. Here we do not attempt to characterise the optimal degree of scepticism
for the rational hearer under this idealisation.
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goals. Allowing for this, an appropriate rule of interpretation for a
rational speaker might instead be along the lines of 28).
28) Increase your belief in G iff prag_arg_str(u, G) >
prag_arg_str(v, G) for all v that are likely assertable and
accessible to the speaker given ¬G.
That is to say, the hearer should interpret an utterance as
evidence for G if it has greater argumentative strength than any
utterance that the speaker would, in practice, be able to produce
in a world in which G was not true.
Interim Summary
The use of number in summarising data is associated with
objectivity and precision, but these concepts are somewhat
negotiable: number interpretation is pragmatically ambiguous
in a number of ways, and the flexibility of numerical
quantification makes it a particularly powerful domain in
which a speaker can use language in the service of particular
communicative goals that may not be shared by the hearer. If a
speaker is argumentative in this sense, a rational hearer should
strive to take this into account when determining whether to
increase or decrease their belief in the proposition for which the
speaker is ultimately arguing, based on the utterance(s) put
forward in support of that proposition.
In the following section we exemplify some of these ideas with
respect to a complex quantitative data set that is argumentatively
described by a large number of distinct stakeholders with similar
communicative goals, namely the results of REF 2014.
Specifically, we will identify predictions that can be made
about speaker behaviour in this context under the assumptions
of the argumentative account, and examine the extent to which
these are borne out.
A CASE STUDY: REPORTING THE
RESEARCH EXCELLENCE FRAMEWORK
The approach outlined above allows us to make and test
predictions about how speakers will use certain numerically
quantified expressions in argumentative contexts. To do this,
we wish to examine production data in a context in which
speakers are summarising complex datasets with a clear
argumentative goal in mind, and in order to evaluate the
predictions we need to have access to the data as well as the
speakers’ productions. We would ideally be focusing on cases in
which the speakers are expert users of argumentative language
and are fully conversant with the details of the data they are
summarising, as this is the scenario in which we expect speakers
to produce argumentatively effective summaries of the data.
In all these respects, the public statements made by
United Kingdom universities about their respective results in
the REF 2014 assessment appear to constitute an appropriate
object of study. In the following subsections, we briefly introduce
the workings of the REF, consider the motivations and
constraints that influence universities’ public statements about
the REF results, articulate a series of predictions about these
statements that follow from our theory, and evaluate these
predictions against the data. We will show that there are clear
indications that the argumentative considerations we discuss are
indeed influencing speakers’ production choices; however, these
productions are nevertheless suboptimal, as anticipated in the
foregoing discussion, and this poses interpretative challenges for
the rational hearer.
The Nature of the Research Excellence
Framework 2014
REF 2014 (Research Excellence Framework) was an exercise
designed to assess the quality of research in United Kingdom
Higher Education Institutions. Its stated aims were to inform the
allocation of research grant funds; to provide accountability for
public investment in research; and to “provide benchmarking
information and establish reputational yardsticks, for use within
the higher education (HE) sector and for public information”
(https://www.ref.ac.uk/2014/about/, retrieved 04/04/20).
For REF 2014, institutions made submissions consisting of
research outputs, case studies of impact derived from research,
and information about the research environment. These
submissions were evaluated by 36 appointed sub-panels and
awarded one of five possible grades, ranging from 4* to U/C
(unclassified). In the case of research outputs, these grades
corresponded to quality that was “world-leading”,
“internationally excellent”, “recognised internationally”,
“recognised nationally”, and which “falls below the standard of
nationally recognised work” respectively (https://www.ref.ac.uk/
2014/panels/assessmentcriteriaandleveldefinitions/, retrieved 04/
04/20).
Institutions typically submitted to multiple sub-panels, and
these distinct submissions were evaluated separately. In all, REF
2014 evaluated 1911 submissions from 154 different institutions:
these submissions comprised 191,150 research outputs and 6975
impact case studies (and represented work by 52,061 academic
staff).
The overall quality profile for each submission comprised a
weighted average of the grades for outputs (65%), impact (20%)
and environment (15%). Across all submissions, 30%were graded
4*, 46% 3*, 20% 2*, 3% 1* and 1% unclassified. However, this
varied appreciably across the three sub-profile measures: only
22% of outputs achieved the 4* rating, whereas 44% of impact
submissions and 45% of environment submissions did so.
When the REF 2014 results were published (December 18,
2014), several media outlets compiled ‘league tables’, perhaps the
most influential being Times Higher Education (THE), who
provided three rankings:
• Grade point average (GPA). 4 points were awarded for 4*
grades, 3 points for 3*, and so on. The overall GPA measure for
an institution was the weighted mean of the GPA for its
individual panel submissions (weighted by the number of
full-time equivalent (FTE) staff whose work was submitted
to each panel).
• Research power. This was computed by multiplying the GPA
by the number of FTE staff submitted by the institution.
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• Research intensity. This was computed by multiplying the
GPA by the proportion of REF-eligible staff whose work was
submitted by the institution. The ranking based on this was
published subsequently to the other two rankings.
The THE main league tables included only multi-subject
institutions (those which submitted to more than one panel),
with single-subject institutions listed separately; we focus on
multi-subject institutions in what follows.
To exemplify the methodology, consider the results from the
Institute for Cancer Research (ranked first on GPA), which
submitted to two sub-panels, namely Clinical Medicine and
Biological Sciences. Its submission for Clinical Medicine
comprised 69 FTE staff and achieved a GPA of 3.33 (which
itself was comprised of scores of 3.09 for outputs, 3.90 for impact
and 3.63 for environment), while that for Biological Sciences
comprised 34 FTE staff and achieved a GPA of 3.55 (3.44 outputs,
3.80 impact, 3.75 environment). The overall weighted mean GPA
was 3.40, which, multiplied by 103 FTE staff, yielded a power
score of 351. The Institute for Cancer Research had 108 FTE REF-
eligible staff, so its research intensity measure was calculated by
multiplying its overall GPA by 103/108: the resulting intensity-
weighted GPA was 3.25, on which measure it again ranked first.
Additional statistics were computed by Research Fortnight
(RF) and published by the Guardian: these prioritised research
power, but added one further measure:
• Research quality. This was calculated as the proportion of 4*
research plus one-third of the proportion of 3* research, based
on the overall quality profile10. As an example, the Institute for
Cancer Research achieved 50% 4* and 41.7% 3* outputs, and
hence a quality index score of 63.9 ( 50 + (41.7/3)).
The average GPA scores for the whole REF were 3.01 for
outputs, 3.24 for impact, and 3.28 for environment. This
represented an appreciable increase in scores from the
previous assessment, the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise
(RAE). Although the official REF results did not report GPA,
they noted an increase in the percentage of outputs judged world-
leading (22% against 14%) and internationally excellent (50%
against 37%). The official summary further noted that “three-
quarters of the universities had at least 10% of their submitted
work graded as world-leading (4*). The top quarter had at least
30% graded as world-leading (4*)” (REF Brief Guide 2014, https://
www.ref.ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/pub/REF%20Brief%20Guide
%202014.pdf, retrieved 30/01/21).
Reporting the Research Excellence
Framework
Many institutions issued press releases summarising their results,
in keeping with the REF’s stated goal to “establish reputational
yardsticks”. However, the REF team did not articulate an official
line as to how the results should be interpreted as evidence of
reputational strength. Consequently, institutions were largely free
to interpret and present the results as they saw fit. This therefore
represents a case in which expert communicators (the
institutional press officers), with full access to a complex
dataset, have the opportunity to select what information to
present and how to present it, in the service of a clearly
motivated argumentative agenda (advancing the perceived
research reputation of their institution).
Against this, of course, it might be argued that–again in the
absence of national policy as to what should be considered prima
facie evidence of reputational strength–institutions were free to
pursue different objectives, and their reportage of the results
might merely reflect that. For example, if an institution had
pursued a strategy of boosting research power at the expense of
GPA, and this was successful, it would be reasonable for them to
present research power data as evidence of their success. Thus, we
cannot exclude an optimistic interpretation under which the
selective reporting of results actually corresponds to the prior
goals of the institutions. Even so, such reporting could mislead
the (non-sceptical) hearer, who might interpret a press release
focusing only on one metric as evidence that the institution in
question could–if challenged–offer similarly strong evidence of its
high reputation across a broader range of metrics, whereas this
might in fact not be the case.
Hypotheses
Our overarching question is whether institutions use
argumentatively effective strategies in the way our theoretical
account predicts, when selectively reporting REF outcome data.
From the rational hearer’s point of view, the corresponding
question is whether it is necessary to take the institutions’
likely argumentative agenda into account when interpreting
the data that they present. Here we aim to unpack this into
specific testable predictions concerning how speakers will act
under the assumption that they are argumentatively effective,
judged by the standard that we proposed in Quantifying
Argumentative Strength, and Allowing for Uncooperativity.
That is to say, we aim to test whether the speakers in this
study–the authors of the institutional reports about their REF
results–are optimising the argumentative strength of their
utterances.
Firstly, we expect argumentatively effective speakers to avoid
presenting information that gives rise to inferences that run
counter to their communicative goals. One potential source of
such information is quantity implicature. We discussed how
numerical expressions of the form top M might give rise to
implicatures of this kind: not only do they convey that top O
is not the case for salient O < M, but, particularly in the case of
non-round M, they potentially convey that top M-1 is not the
case. Consequently, we expect argumentatively effective speakers
to use top M formulations only when they can do so while
avoiding argumentatively disadvantageous quantity implicatures.
Secondly, we expect argumentatively effective speakers to
avoid presenting contextual information when doing so would
promote inferences that run counter to their communicative
10A motivation for the use of this measure was the expectation that funding
allocations would be based on the proportions of 4* and 3* research, with 4*
weighted three times as heavily as 3* research.
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goals. In the REF context, multiple rankings are available for
discussion, most notably the GPA and power rankings, and this is
evident to the speaker but not necessarily evident to the hearer. A
rational hearer, aware of the existence of multiple rankings, might
expect the speaker to quote the most favourable one and could
infer that other unmentioned rankings were less favourable to
that institution. We might therefore expect an argumentatively
effective speaker to avoid indicating to the hearer that multiple
rankings exist, in order to preserve the hearer’s ignorance on this
point and thus prevent the hearer from drawing an unfavourable
inference.
Thirdly, we expect argumentatively effective speakers to avoid
presenting information that fails to support their communicative
goal more clearly than it supports the negation of that goal. In the
context of the REF, we assume that the press releases issued are
intended to bolster the reputation of the institution in question
with reference to its competitors. Presenting statements in
support of the institution’s quality that would also be true of
its competitors would therefore be an ineffective strategy in terms
of argumentative force. Moreover, in a sceptical hearer (of the
kind discussed in Rational Interpretation in an Argumentative
Context), it would invite the inference that nothing more
favourable could be said about the institution in question than
that which could be said of its competitors. Thus, such statements
would be ineffective (given a rational hearer unaware of the
speaker’s argumentative agenda) or actively counterproductive
(given a sceptical hearer who takes the speaker’s argumentative
agenda into account), when considered as arguments for the
institution’s quality. Note that we assume, in making this
prediction, that the speaker takes the hearer to be
knowledgeable as regards what could be truthfully said of the
institution’s competitors: we return to the implications of this
assumption in General Discussion.
Hence, in summary, we make the following predictions about
the reporting of REF results:
H1: Speakers will use argumentatively appropriate
reference points: an institution will be described as “top M”
only if its ranking is near M, and speakers will avoid using non-
round M.
H2: Speakers will prioritise favourable rankings and
suppress unfavourable rankings: if the GPA and power
rankings differ in how highly they place an institution, the
more favourable ranking will be reported and the report will
not convey the existence of an alternative ranking scheme.
H3: Speakers will avoid argumentatively unhelpful
statements: they should not attempt to argue for the
reputational strength of their institution on the basis of
statements that would also be true of lower-ranked institutions.
Procedure
We collated data from the top 40 institutions, according to the
GPA rankings, focusing in each case on descriptions of
institution-wide accomplishments rather than those of
individual faculties or departments. We first searched for press
releases that had been issued at an institutional level on December
18, 2014 in connection with REF 2014 results, as archived on
institutions’ websites: these were available for 29 of the 40
institutions. Where these were not available we looked for
summary pages detailing REF 2014 results as part of the
institutions’ general profiles: these were available for 10 of the
remaining 11 institutions. In this way we obtained information
from all institutions in the top 40 except the London School of
Economics and Political Science (ranked third by GPA), which is
hence excluded from the following analysis.
Results
H1: Use Best Available Reference Points
We predicted that expressions such as top M, used
argumentatively, will be uttered only in connection with
institutions that are ranked just above the relevant threshold,
and only with round n, in order to avoid argumentatively
unfavourable implicatures.
29)–38) represent all the uses of top M in the REF reports we
examined that make reference to the overall institutional ranking.
We indicate in square brackets the precise ranking that these
quotes allude to.
29) Cardiff in top five for research excellence . . . The quality
and impact of Cardiff’s research has led to a meteoric rise
in league tables, pushing it into the UK’s top 5
universities [5th]
30) [King’s College London is] Top 10 nationally for research
‘power’ and ‘quality’ [6th, 7th].
31) Warwick repeats top 10 success in UK research ranking
exercise. [8th equal]
32) The [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine]
is ranked in the top 10 of all universities in the UK.
[10th]
33) The results demonstrate excellence across research, putting
Sheffield in the top 10 per cent of all UK universities. [16th
equal  10th percentile11].
34) University of Leeds in top 10 for research and impact
power [10th]
35) Royal Holloway is within the top 25 per cent of UK
universities for research rated ‘world-leading’ or
‘internationally excellent’ [26th equal on unweighted
measure  21st percentile]
36) Swansea research breaks into UK top 30. [26th equal]
37) Essex has re-confirmed its position as one of the UK’s top
20 research universities. [20th]
38) [Strathclyde is] Top 20 in the UK for Research Intensity.
[18th]
As predicted, each of these descriptions uses round values ofM
in the top M formulation, and in each case no comparably salient
O < M exists for which the top O claim would be true. Hence we
can see these examples as demonstrating a preference on the part
11Among multi-subject institutions, Sheffield ranks equal 14th out of 128 on the
GPA measure; including single-subject institutions, it ranks equal 16th out of 154,
hence on the cusp of the top decile. We assume this is the metric that the authors of
the press release have in mind.
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of the speaker to choose top M descriptions that are
argumentatively effective, by the measures we discuss.
There are also indications in these data that the possibility of
describing the institution as top M for some relatively small
round value of M has motivated the choice of ranking criteria.
Essex, in 37), and Strathclyde, in 38), both appeal to the research
intensity measure, on which they are ranked considerably
higher than on either of the measures initially published.
Strikingly, Essex places 22nd on this measure, but 20th
among universities-that is to say 37) is true if we do not
consider the Institute for Cancer Research or the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to be universities
(notwithstanding 32)). Similarly, Cardiff places 6th on research
excellence as measured by GPA, but improves to 5th if we
exclude the Institute for Cancer Research from consideration.
Thus, their rhetorical move of focusing on universities may be
motivated by the argumentative advantage of being able to make
the top five claim rather than merely top six, which is
semantically weaker but also gives rise to an argumentatively
disadvantageous implicature exactly 6th.
Other uses of top M in these data involve generalisations over
faculties or subject areas, and are sometimes combined with
appeal to non-obvious ranking choices, as for example in 39)
and (perhaps most extremely) 40). However, as we are restricting
our attention here to descriptions of the institutions as a whole,
we will not discuss these cases further, other than to note that they
represent an alternative way to present the data for argumentative
effect.
39) On actual research outputs 19 of Warwick’s departments
were ranked in the top 10 in the UK.
40) More than 25 per cent of the DurhamUniversity subjects
entered for REF 2014 were in the top 5 subjects [sic]
nationally for grade point average (overall score).
H2: Prioritise Favourable Rankings, Suppress
Unfavourable Rankings
Taking the GPA and power rankings to be the most salient, we
hypothesise that institutions will prefer to report the measure on
which they rank more highly, as this constitutes better evidence
of their high reputation. We also hypothesise that institutions
will decline to mention the existence of the alternative measure,
as this would invite inferences about their relative performance
on that measure that would be detrimental to their
reputational claim.
Of the 39 institutions for which we have data, 19 are ranked
higher on GPA than power and 19 are ranked higher on power
than GPA (the University of Durham places 20th on both
rankings). Of the former group, nine mention GPA in their
report and none mention power (a significant difference: p <
0.01, sign test), while ten do not make explicit reference to either
measure. Of the latter group, 11 prioritise reference to power over
GPA (eight of which do not mention the GPAmeasure at all) and
two prioritise reference to GPA and do not mention power (again
a significant difference: p < 0.05, sign test), while six do not make
explicit reference to either measure. There is thus a significant
interaction (p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test), showing a clear
preference for institutions to prefer the measure on which
they rank higher and most commonly not to acknowledge the
existence of the less favourable measure.
Outside of these two major statistics, the most popular
measure for first mention was the combined proportion of
research attaining a particular quality threshold, which was
cited first by 14 institutions. 11 institutions focused on their
proportion of 4* and 3* research: of these 11, 8 rank more highly
on this measure than on either GPA or power. However,
although this is compatible with a view in which the choice
of this measure has been generally motivated by the wish to
report a high ranking, in fact only two of these institutions
comment on their rankings by this measure: Royal Holloway, in
40), which makes a claim that it could also make with reference
to the GPA measure, and Queen Mary University of London, in
41), although the data from the summary table appears to place
it 8th on this measure.
41) Royal Holloway is within the top 25 per cent of UK
universities for research rated ‘world-leading’ or
‘internationally excellent’.
42) Overall QMUL is ranked 5th in the UK [among multi-
faculty institutions] for the percentage of its 3* and 4*
research outputs.
Alongside the reference to the combined proportion of 4* and
3* research, two of these 11 institutions also make reference to
GPA, one to power, and eight to neither. Thus, the general pattern
is once again one in which institutions do not acknowledge the
existence of alternative rankings which would describe them less
favourably.
As we discussed earlier, the extent to which institutions
acknowledge alternative measures could reasonably be
expected to bear heavily on hearers’ interpretations of the
information provided. 43), from King’s College London,
represents a particularly transparent presentation of the
alternative measures (the ‘quality’ measure here referring to
GPA): the institution’s preferred measure is complemented
immediately by reference to the salient alternative. 44), from
the University of East Anglia (UEA), is somewhat more opaque in
this respect: the institution’s preferred measure (focusing wholly
on outputs, rather than the combined measure) is not one that is
usually tabulated in its own right, and neither the overall GPA nor
the power rating are alluded to in the following text. The hearer of
44) might reasonably be surprised to findUEA ranked 23rd by the
THE for research quality.
43) King’s has risen to 6th position nationally in the ‘power’
ranking–up from 11th in the Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE) 2008. ‘Power’ takes into account both
the quality and the quantity of research activity. King’s has
also risen to 7th position for quality–up from 22nd in 2008.
44) UEA is 10th in the UK for quality of research outputs.
Over 82% of UEA research is rated as ‘world-leading’ or
‘internationally excellent’.
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H3: Avoid Argumentatively Unhelpful Statements
Our third prediction was that speakers would tend to avoid
arguing for their institutions’ reputational strength on the
basis of statements that could also be truthfully asserted of
lower-ranked institutions, on the basis that such statements
would be argumentatively at best ineffective and at worst
(given a sceptical hearer) counterproductive. However, there
are a striking number of apparent counterexamples to this
among the data, as exemplified by 45)–50), which include
several article headlines.
45) The REF 2014 showed that the vast majority of Newcastle
University’s research was placed in the top two categories
of 4*(world leading) or 3* (internationally excellent).
46) The University of Nottingham is a leading international
institution carrying out world-class research, according
to the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2014.
47) [The University of Exeter has] world-leading research in
all the units we submitted to REF. . .
48) Liverpool research ranked in UK top 10.
49) REF highlights world leading research at Aston.
50) Research at the University of Dundee has been ranked
among the very best in the United Kingdom.
51) University of Sussex research is ‘world-leading’, major
review finds.
Of these examples, 45) makes a quantitative claim, but the
strength of this depends on the interpretation of the vast
majority. The relevant figure in this case is 79%, which
places Newcastle 34th on this metric. Were the claim merely
a majority, Newcastle would share this distinction with all the
top 88 institutions in the GPA ranking; if we interpret the
threshold for vast majority at, for instance, 66%, then 63
institutions still meet this criterion. We note that the rest of
the press release does not encourage the reader to contextualise
the claim in this way, and does not present any information that
would be helpful to them in doing so.
The headline 48) also makes a quantitative claim, but this
turns out, on closer inspection, to be existential in character:
the body text clarifies that seven subjects at Liverpool were
ranked in the top 10 nationally (by the measure of “research
excellence”). As there are 36 sub-panels in play, and given the
possibility of appealing to multiple distinct measures, the
claim of having “research ranked in UK top 10” is
argumentatively a relatively weak one, although it is
impossible to verify precisely how weak without detailed
examination of the overall distribution of outcomes by sub-
panel.
The subsequent examples here all focus on the existence of
world-leading research at the respective institutions. In the
context of the REF results, this is a surprisingly weak claim
from an argumentative perspective. As noted earlier, three-
quarters of the universities submitting to REF 2014 had at
least 10% of their work graded as 4*. Indeed, only 72 of the
1911 submissions failed to have any work at all graded at 4*, so
the claim made by Exeter as 47) is one that could be made by the
majority of institutions submitting to REF, while the existential
claims of 49)–51) could be made by 151 of the 154 institutions.
Thus, to the extent that these claims are to be understood as
arguments to the effect that Aston, Dundee and Sussex are above-
average institutions (which they are, according to the GPA
measure), they appear to have very little argumentative
strength, according to the measures proposed in this paper.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Individual institutions’ reporting of the results of REF 2014
represents a scenario in which speakers can be expected to
summarise complex data in an argumentatively effective way,
in the service of a generally clear communicative goal, namely to
emphasise the high quality of the institution’s research. Based on
the approach to argumentation discussed in this paper, we were
able to articulate three predictions as to how speakers would
behave in this case. Two of these were borne out. Given a choice of
rankings to report, institutions have broadly behaved in
accordance with a strategy of selecting the ranking that is
most favourable, and presenting little information to hint at
the existence of other, less favourable, data. This would accord
with a strategy of presenting argumentatively strong information
while dissuading the hearer from drawing ad hoc inferences that
undermine its argumentative point. The use of the formulation
top M also adheres to the predicted principles: the formulation is
used only when the precise ranking is close toM andM is a round
number. Again, the effect is not to invite the hearer to draw
inferences that would be deleterious to the argument being
advanced.
Speaker behaviour in this case study, however, deviated
strikingly from our third prediction: argumentatively weak
information was frequently presented, as seen in 45)–51),
where assertions are made that could equally truthfully be
made of institutions which had performed much less well.
This represents a challenge for the explanatory utility of the
approach we suggest–how can we explain this choice of
communicative strategy?
Recall that in Quantifying Argumentative Strength, and
Allowing for Uncooperativity we raised the question of how
sceptical a rational hearer should be about the use of simple
descriptions of complex data, when evaluating the argumentative
strength of these descriptions and using that to update beliefs. A
minimally sceptical approach would be to increase one’s belief in
some proposition G given an utterance u if the probability that
u is true given G exceeds the probability that u is true given the
negation of G (and to decrease one’s belief in G if the reverse is
true). For example, if we consider 47) as u and assume G is the
proposition that Exeter is an outstanding research university,
this condition is clearly satisfied, and we should increase our
belief in G on hearing 47). A maximally sceptical approach
would be to increase one’s belief in G given u only if u is
argumentatively better than any of the things that could be said
given that G were false (and to decrease one’s belief in G
otherwise). In this case, taking the same values of u and G as
before, this condition is not satisfied: 47) would likely be true
even if Exeter were not an outstanding research university (and
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its REF results reflected that), so we should decrease our belief
in G given 47).
In practice, 47) illustrates an intermediate case: it represents
a relatively weak argumentative claim, but this could be for
distinct reasons. One possibility is that the speaker of 47)
thinks that the hearer will not be sceptical in the way suggested
by the above account in how they update their beliefs, and
therefore expects this argument to convey positive
argumentative strength: we could think of this as the
speaker being optimistic about the receptiveness of the
audience to their argument. Another possibility is that the
speaker has simply not considered that 47) is an objectively
weak argument, given that it is something that tens of
institutions ranked below Exeter on the standard metrics
could also say12. In this case, we could regard the speaker
as being incompetent at maximising argumentative
strength–and, to the extent that speakers behave this way,
we could conclude that the model is inadequate for capturing
speaker behaviour.
It is also worth considering a third possibility. Perhaps the
speaker of 47) thinks that the hearer is not aware that this
assertion would also be true for lower-ranked institutions, and
consequently believes that the hearer will perceive the utterance
to have positive argumentative strength, even if the speaker
knows this not to be the case. This is somewhat analogous to the
case of Hypothesis 2, in which the speaker exploits the hearer’s
ignorance about alternative measures: it is reasonable to expect
the hearer to be less than fully informed about the REF results
for competing institutions, and this would license the speaker
to exploit the argumentative potential of utterances that would
not be predicted to be argumentatively effective with fully
knowledgeable hearers13. In general, we feel that this is a
plausible explanation for argumentative speakers’ divergence
from the theoretically optimal strategy. However, in order to
evaluate this explanation empirically, we would need to
establish the hearers’ knowledgeability (and specifically how
this is perceived by the speakers), which cannot be read off the
data we examine in this paper.
In summary, then, the picture presented by the REF reports
is (perhaps characteristically) mixed. The authors of these
reports are, collectively, not entirely consistent in
maximising argument strength, by the measures proposed
in Quantifying Argumentative Strength, and Allowing for
Uncooperativity. However, at the same time, they are clearly
not neutral in their treatment of the data. Consequently, these
texts place considerable demands on the rational hearer who
wishes to interpret the claims being made. Given a hearer who
accepts their reports at face value, perhaps 20 or more
institutions might be able to convince that hearer that they
belong in the top 10; however, given a maximally sceptical
hearer, perhaps only about 10 institutions might be able to
convince that hearer that they belong in the top 20.
Thus, as far as these press releases are concerned, the hearer
cannot arrive at any close approximation of an objectively
accurate interpretation of the results by adopting any of the
first three strategies canvassed earlier in this paper. Adopting the
straightforward semantic or pragmatic approaches to
argumentative strength, the hearer will generally infer that the
universities’ research has been evaluated more favourably by REF
than is in fact the case. Adopting the more demanding stance of
expecting the best possible descriptions, the hearer will
overcompensate and infer that the evaluations are in fact
worse, in most instances, than was actually the case. To
decipher the descriptions accurately, from the standpoint of
argumentative strength, the hearer has to be aware that the
speakers are systematically making efforts in the direction of
maximising argumentative strength, but also that they are
inconsistent in how effectively they achieve this.
These data exemplify a much more widespread problem,
concerning both how complex information should be
summarised in order not to mislead the hearer, and how the
hearer should interpret summary information in order to
reconstruct the best possible approximation to the underlying
reality. The problem is clearly accentuated when a speaker has a
particular argumentative agenda, even when they are determined
to advance that agenda only through the presentation of true and
accurate (albeit carefully selected) facts. It is perhaps rather
unfortunate, although not entirely surprising, that this challenge
is so strongly in evidence in the context of the reporting of REF
2014 results, in which some of the United Kingdom’s most
esteemed institutions participate in an exercise designed to
determine their “reputational strength”.
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